Empirically real outer objects depend entirely on space for their properties

Empirically real outer objects depend entirely on space for their properties

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Empirically real outer objects depend entirely on space for their properties. Their primary qualities (if you will), extension, motion and rest, attraction and repulsion, all are spatial; without space, they would have no properties at all. If this is right, then when we attempt to think away the spatial properties of outer objects, we are left with nothing. Are things in themselves, then, nothing? Or are appearances mere fabrications? An obvious criticism of Kant's doctrine is that by claiming that things in space are appearances, he means that they are only apparently spatial. This Kant denied most vehemently. Mere seeming ( Schein ) occurs when we are deceived by an object of experience, e.g. by thinking we see water when there is only the hot desert sand. But appearance, ( Erscheinung ) is real; it has what Kant called empirical reality. On the other hand, appearances are transcendentally ideal. They are a priori conditions of sensibility. (The word 'transcendental' was used by Kant officially
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Empirically real outer objects depend entirely on space for their properties

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