I represent myself as an object of inner intuition by representing successive states in time

I represent myself as an object of inner intuition by representing successive states in time

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I represent myself as an object of inner intuition by representing successive states in time. As we saw in the Refutation of Idealism, such a representation is not that of a permanent substance, so the soul as construed by metaphysics is not given through inner intuition. It is only the appearance of an unknown something = x. As Kant construes the Paralogisms, one starts with a set of analytic truths about a thinking subject and concludes from them properties of the soul as a thing in itself. We think ourselves as a simple subject which is identical through time, but this has nothing to do with anything but ourselves as appearance. To say that I think myself as subject is nothing more than to say that I think myself as that which thinks. This judgment is patently analytic. If it is added that this subject is substance, the judgment is again analytic, if the concept of substance thus attributed is that of a subject which is not a predicate of any other subject (this is the "logical" meaning of the category of substance). A mistake occurs when
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Unformatted text preview: attributes permanence to the subject, i.e., makes a "real" use of the category of substance. For permanence applies only to objects in time, but the metaphysical subject, the thing in itself, is not in time. We are unable in particular to infer from the substantiality of the I which thinks to the immortality of the soul. Perhaps immortality follows from the simplicity of the subject. The Wolffian argument was that because the soul is a simple subject, it cannot be dissolved into parts, and hence cannot be destroyed by any force in nature. The simplicity of the soul is said (by Kant) to be analytic in this sense: that the I which thinks a complete thought is the same I which thinks each component of the thought. But this unity is merely formal: it has nothing to do with any underlying reality. All it says is that we cannot think any multiplicity in the single 'I.' But this is only because the representation of the 'I' is empty, "the poorest of all representations."...
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