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Unformatted text preview: attributes permanence to the subject, i.e., makes a "real" use of the category of substance. For permanence applies only to objects in time, but the metaphysical subject, the thing in itself, is not in time. We are unable in particular to infer from the substantiality of the I which thinks to the immortality of the soul. Perhaps immortality follows from the simplicity of the subject. The Wolffian argument was that because the soul is a simple subject, it cannot be dissolved into parts, and hence cannot be destroyed by any force in nature. The simplicity of the soul is said (by Kant) to be analytic in this sense: that the I which thinks a complete thought is the same I which thinks each component of the thought. But this unity is merely formal: it has nothing to do with any underlying reality. All it says is that we cannot think any multiplicity in the single 'I.' But this is only because the representation of the 'I' is empty, "the poorest of all representations."...
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- Fall '09