In Kant - For Kant, the two separate faculties of...

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In Kant's terms, objects of sensibility are appearances , things which are given in sensible intuition which represents them as individuals. Through concepts, on the other hand, we think things in general, apart from the way they are given to the sensibility. On the Leibnizian view, the objects of sensibility are just a distorted version of the objects of the understanding ("noumena"). So, again in Kant's terms, Leibniz has taken appearances for things in themselves. That is, Leibniz thought that the same principles (e.g., the Identity of Indiscernibles) which apply to objects of the understanding apart from sensibility also apply to those objects of which we are sensible, since there is no intrinsic difference between the two.
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Unformatted text preview: For Kant, the two separate faculties of sensibility and understanding must work together for human knowledge to be possible. Each must make its own distinctive contributions: concepts on the part of the understanding and intuitions on the part of sensibility. "To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the other. Without sensibility, no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts"...
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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