Some commentators have found deeper problems with the distinction. An extreme interpretation is that Kant's idealism is a form of phenomenalism, in the sense that the objects of experience are no more than bundles of perceptions. If so, then appearances are nothing more than the way things seem to be to a perceiving being, while things in themselves are the way they really are. But Kant clearly rejected the claim that appearances ( Erschinungen ) are mere seemings ( Schein ). The difference between the way things are and the way they seem to be is an empirical difference, akin to that between primary and secondary qualities. Extended objects are empirically real and only transcendentally ideal. (See the Lexicon entry on Idealism .) On the other hand, Kant frequently described things in themselves using such language as "the real per se ." Decribed in this way, things in themselves would seem to have a higher degree of reality than appearances, especially since appearances are frequently characterized as "representations." Now representations are real (as Kant
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