Speculative reason can do no more than secure the logical possibility of freedom

Speculative reason can do no more than secure the logical possibility of freedom

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Speculative reason can do no more than secure the logical possibility of freedom, immortality and God. There is no contradiction in any of the concepts, because they pertain to things in themselves, which are not subject to the conditions of experience. As the actions of an empirical subject, my actions are determined by causal laws, but as transcendental subject, they may be transcendentally free. As an object in time, I have a limited span of life, but as transcendental object I am not determined in time at all. God can never be met with in any experience, be invoked as a necessary condition for experience, or proved a priori to exist. But a most real being is at least minimally thinkable. In the case of freedom, "morality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be understood, but only that it should not contradict itself, and so should at least allow of being thought" (Bxxix). The transcendental ideas of God and immortality are relatively easy to accommodate on Kant's scheme, since their their objects (assuming they have objects) are
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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Speculative reason can do no more than secure the logical possibility of freedom

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