The assignment to all the representations of a judgment to myself is an act of synthesis, so the representation of the unity of self-consciousness is synthetic in a sense. Kant writes as if it is this "synthetic unity" which makes possible the unity of intuition, the representation of singular given objects. He says that "the manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible (Section 17)." In Section 17, Kant states that the conditions which make the unity of apperception possible also make the unity of intuition possible. "All my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression, ' I think '" (B138). The unity of intuition is said to be subject to the synthetic unity of apperception
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.