This view seems congenial to yet another way of understanding Kant

This view seems congenial to yet another way of understanding Kant

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This view seems congenial to yet another way of understanding Kant's distinction, i.e., that things in themselves and apperances (as representations) are distinct objects, standing in some sort of "grounding" relation. Things in themselves are the ground of representations of them in space and time. This "two-object" or "double-object" view has plenty of difficulties of its own. One problem is that the categories are said not to apply to things in themselves, which makes the "ground" relation questionable, despite Kant's careless use of the word 'cause' to describe the source of our intuitions. A possible way around this criticism (a prominent advocate of this view is Wilfrid Sellars) is to describe "grounding" as only analogically related to the category of causality. A hint of such a view can be found at A566/B594). The opposing approach is the "double-object" or "double-aspect" interpretation, according to which things have two "sides," that by which they are intuited as appearances and that by which they are thought in themselves, apart from intuition. Many passages in Kant support this interpretation. I have always wondered, however,
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This view seems congenial to yet another way of understanding Kant

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