take place, but because it is an action which oughtto be undertaken. We impose on our actions imperatives. Thus practical reason serves as an intelligible ground for human action. "This 'ought' expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anhything but a mere concept; whereas in the case of merely natural action the ground must always be an appearance" (A547/B575). In this way, practical reason can be seen as a cause, and its "causality," the action which brings about the effect, stands outside of time. Because it is outside of time, it does not begin to be and hence is not subject to the conditions governing beginnings in time. "Reason therefore acts freely; it is not dynamically determined in the chain of natural causes through either outer or inner ground antecedent in time" (A553/B581). Nonetheless, it is "the power of originating a series of events" (A554/B582) in such a way that its actions require no temporally antecedent conditions.
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