Lecture+10+October+19

Lecture+10+October+19 - Today in Comparative Politics...

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Unformatted text preview: Today in Comparative Politics Economic and Cultural Impacts on Democracy: Some Empirical Evidence Democratic Transitions Collective Action True? 7 ,9 6 ,4 7,9 6,4 DG 1,2 6 ,4 1,2 6,4 DA 3,5 3,5 10 ,0 10 ,0 UG 3,5 3,5 10 ,0 10 ,0 UA 1 BL BH TL TH 2 (D,A),(B,H) is a Nash equilibrium but is not subgame perfect: A is not a optimal move for 1 in the boxed subgame. Some questions for empirical analysis Catholic Hypothesis Countries with a majority Catholic population are less likely to become and stay democratic. Protestant Hypothesis Countries with a majority Protestant population are more likely to become and stay democratic. Islam Hypothesis Countries with a majority Muslim population are less likely to become and stay democratic. Ethnic Group Hypothesis Countries with a large number of ethnic groups are less likely to become and stay democratic. Religious Group Hypothesis Countries with a large number of religious groups are less likely to become and stay democratic. Cultural Group Hypothesis Countries with a large number of cultural groups are less likely to become and stay democratic. Some questions for empirical analysis Dependent variable: Probability of Becoming a Democracy Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Muslim majority-0.28 ** (0.12)-0.18 (0.16)-0.23 (0.17)-0.25 (0.19) (0.16) Protestant majority-0.56 (0.35)-0.42 (0.38)-0.40 (0.38)-0.45 (0.39)-0.43 (0.38) Catholic majority 0.33 *** (0.10) 0.31 *** (0.12) 0.26 ** (0.12) 0.26 ** (0.13) 0.31 ** (0.13) GDP per capita 0.00004 * (0.00002) 0.00003 * (0.00002) 0.00003 * (0.00002) 0.00004 * (0.00002) Growth in GDP per capita-0.02 ** (0.01)-0.02 ** (0.01)-0.02 ** (0.01)-0.02 ** (0.01) Oil producer-0.15 (0.18)-0.12 (0.19)-0.13 (0.19)-0.15 (0.18) Effective no. of ethnic groups-0.02 (0.02) Effective no. of religious grps-0.06 (0.09) Effective no. of cultural grps 0.02 (0.08) Constant-2.06 *** (0.07)-2.05 *** (0.10)-1.94 *** (0.13)-1.91 *** (0.23)-2.06 *** (0.19) Observations 4379 2578 2563 2578 2563 Log-likelihood-418.75-318.64-317.85-318.46-318.35 Robust standard errors in parentheses. * greater than 90% significant; ** greater than 95% significant; *** greater than 99% significant. Dependent variable: Probability of Becoming a Democracy Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Muslim majority-0.28 ** (0.12)-0.18 (0.16)-0.23 (0.17)-0.25 (0.19) (0.16) Protestant majority-0.56 (0.35)-0.42 (0.38)-0.40 (0.38)-0.45 (0.39)-0.43 (0.38) Catholic majority 0.33 *** (0.10) 0.31 *** (0.12) 0.26 ** (0.12) 0.26 ** (0.13) 0.31 ** (0.13) GDP per capita 0.00004 * (0.00002) 0.00003 * (0.00002) 0.00003 * (0.00002) 0.00004 * (0.00002) Growth in GDP per capita-0.02 ** (0.01)-0.02 ** (0.01)-0.02 ** (0.01)-0.02 ** (0.01) Oil producer-0.15 (0.18)-0.12 (0.19)-0.13 (0.19)-0.15 (0.18) Effective no. of ethnic groups-0.02 (0.02) Effective no. of religious grps-0.06 (0.09) Effective no. of cultural grps 0.02 (0.08) Constant...
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Lecture+10+October+19 - Today in Comparative Politics...

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