Lecture+11+October+26

Lecture+11+October+26 - Today in Comparative Politics •...

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Unformatted text preview: Today in Comparative Politics • Transitions to, and toward, democracy • Revolutions from below • Collective action problems • Tipping models • Elite-sponsored transitions Collective Action Problem • Would you join a pro-democracy protest like those in East Germany or would you stay at home? • You know that one person is unlikely to be the decisive factor in determining whether the protest is going to be successful. • You also know that it is costly to participate in the protest. The lure of non-participation • If the pro-democracy rally fails, non- participants bear no costs. • If it succeeds, non-participants can “free ride” because everyone benefits from the establishment of democracy • whether they participated in the protest or not. Collective Action Problem • Benefit to each if both participate = B • Cost of participation = C > 0 • Suppose B > C 3 players: need ≥ 2 to succeed Player 3: Don’t Participate (0, 0, 0) (0, - C, 0) Don’t Participate (- C, 0, 0) (B - C, B - C, B) Participate Player 1 Don’t Participate Participate Player 2 Player 3: Participate (0, 0, - C) (B, B - C, B - C) Don’t Participate (B - C, B, B - C) (B - C, B - C, B - C) Participate Player 1 Don’t Participate Participate Player 2 Nash equilibria Player 3: Don’t Participate (0, 0, 0) (0, - C, 0) Don’t Participate (- C, 0, 0) (B - C, B - C, B) Participate Player 1 Don’t Participate Participate Player 2 Player 3: Participate (0, 0, - C) (B, B - C, B - C) Don’t Participate (B - C, B, B - C) (B - C, B - C, B - C) Participate Player 1 Don’t Participate Participate Player 2 Nash equilibria • 2 types • No one participates. • Exactly the minimum number needed participate. • These properties generalize. Suppose group needs ≥ k of n • Again, 2 types of Nash equilibria • No one participates. • Exactly k do. • In such equilibria, no one has reason to reconsider his action. • When is any given player pivotal to the group’s success? • When exactly k – 1 others participate. • To attain such equilibria, k players need to think that they are among the exactly k people who are going to participate. Size of n • The size of the group ( n ) is important because it influences the likelihood that you will view yourself as critical to the collective action. • Should you run the risks associated with participating in a pro-democracy protest if n is large? • If hardly anyone is protesting, then your individual participation is unlikely to matter. • If lots of people are already protesting, then your individual participation is unlikely to matter. Size of n • The bottom line is that larger groups find it harder to overcome the collective action problem than small groups....
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This note was uploaded on 11/10/2011 for the course POLI SCI 790:103 taught by Professor Blair during the Fall '09 term at Rutgers.

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Lecture+11+October+26 - Today in Comparative Politics •...

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