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Study+guide+for+final+exam+Fall+2009

Study+guide+for+final+exam+Fall+2009 - Study guide for...

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Study guide for final exam Introduction to Comparative Politics December 2009 Professor Douglas Blair Chapter 2 CGG’s critique of the comparative method Deductive models as an alternative; falsificationism Chapter 3 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game: introduction to backward-induction determination of SPNE. Relationship of SPNE to non-SP Nash equilibria. Chapter 4 Contractarian v. predatory theories of the state Chapter 5 Substantive v. minimalist/procedural conceptions of democracy Dahl’s views of democracy PACL, Polity IV, and Freedom House measures of democracy Are they nominal, ordinal, or interval measures? Are they grounded in substantive or procedural notions of democracy? How do they compare in terms of reliability and predictability? Significance of these distinctions Chapter 6 Modernization theory à la Lipset Przeworski et al.’s alternative: high income and wealth as aids to democratic survival, but not to its origins Rationales for each How can we distinguish them empirically? Mechanisms for economic modernization to influence democratization à la Bates-Lien or North-Weingast: changing ability of sovereign to tax, changing mobility of assets, limitations on royal power as solution to credible commitment problems, etc.
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2 Implications for the roles of extractable natural resources and foreign aid in the democratization process Chapter 7 “Civic culture”—a widely shared cluster of attitudes—as a prerequisite to successful democracy, from Montesquieu and Mill to Almond-Verba and Inglehart Empirical status of such claims Are the attitudes claimed to comprise civic culture in fact correlated with one another? Are they correlated with the stability of democracy? If so, which way does causation run? Empirical evidence on religion and the emergence and survival of democracy Role of particular religions: are particular religions more or less likely to transition into democracy or to remain democratic? Role of religious (or ethnic, linguistic or cultural) diversity: are diverse nations more or less likely to transition into democracy or to remain democratic? Chapter 8 Bottom-up transitions Participation in mass protest as a prototypical collective action problem Public goods (and participation in protests as a public good) Symmetric (identical benefit B and participation-cost C) Nash equilibrium models with benefit available only if k out of n persons participate Impact of k and n on likelihood of protest success Collective action problem as partial explanation of the stability of communist regimes pre-1989 Tipping or threshold models Participation games with different costs of participation across players Participation cascades Role in helping explain the actual instability of seemingly stable regimes, e.g., in Eastern Europe in 1980-90 Top-down transitions Broadened dictatorships: liberalization as an attempt to co-opt opposition groups
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3 Incomplete-information model of the decision to liberalize Liberalization as an equilibrium phenomenon arising when “soft-liners” are uncertain about the strength of opposition groups (pp. 307-10; relies on
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