{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

76 - “fittings tige Econ 445 Summer 2010 Homework 3 Due...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Background image of page 1
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: “fittings tige- Econ 445 Summer 2010 Homework 3 Due Friday July 16th 1 Solve for all the Nash equilibria in the below game. Are there any dominant ,t strategies for any of the players? 4g 4"" I-mrf ' I I-“ I P NY“??? ‘ 2 Consider the Cournot duopoly model Where inverse demand is given by P(Q) = a 7 M), where the aggregate quantity Q is simply q; + £12. Both firms simultaneously choose quantities. Let both firms have cost function 0(0) = C(12- a) What are the actions for each player? Strategies? 1)) Find each firm’s best response function, i.e. for firm i, find q: = 33494) c) Using the definition of a Nash equilibrium and best response functions, solve for the Nash equilibrium quantites. ...
View Full Document

{[ snackBarMessage ]}