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Unformatted text preview: Response to Parmenides Aristotle gives his response to Parmenides in chapter 8. He begins (191a28-29) by summarizing the Parmenidean argument against coming to be that we mentioned above: What is cannot come to be (since it already is), while nothing can come to be from what is not . The idea of this argument seems to be this: in a case of coming to be, the resulting object is clearly a being, something that is . From what initial object does it come to be? Parmenides offers us only two choices: either what is or what is not. But if the initial object is what is, and the resultant object is also what is, we don’t really have a case of coming to be-there is no change. And if the initial object is what is not, we have another kind of impossibility, for nothing can come to be from what is not ( ex nihilo nihil fit ). Aristotle’s response is to reject the Parmenidean dilemma “that something comes to be from what is or from what is not” (191a30). He does so, characteristically, by drawing a distinction what is or from what is not” (191a30)....
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.
- Fall '09