A first argument for Compatibilism: Hobbes’ Solution A FREE-MAN, is he, that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to doe, is not hindred to doe that he has a will to . .. from the use of the word Free-will, no Liberty can be inferred of the will, desire or inclination, but the Liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to doe. (Leviathan, Ch XXI) How could we to use these considerations to refute the argument that is given above, viz: P1 If determinism is true, then every human action is causally necessitated P2 If every action is causally necessitated, no one could have acted otherwise P3 One only has free will if one could have acted otherwise P4 Determinism is true C No one has free will One response would be to simply deny P3; free actions are those that stem from our desires, there is no need for it to be true that we could have done otherwise. But don’t we want to preserve the idea that we could have done otherwise? How might this be done? A first try might
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.