ARGUMENTS FROM ILLUSION

ARGUMENTS FROM ILLUSION - willing is the same in both...

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ARGUMENTS FROM ILLUSION P1: In cases of illusion and of veridical perception, the subject has the same (kind of) experience. P2: In cases of illusion the experience is not an experience of an external object. C: In cases of veridical perception the experience is not an experience of an external object. Similarly for Wegner the claim seems to be that, since we are often wrong about our actions, the conscious willing cannot be what causes the action even in cases in which we are right, since the
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Unformatted text preview: willing is the same in both cases. (Here the claim is not that we lack direct acquaintance with our conscious wills, but rather that our conscious wills cannot be the direct causes of action.) More precisely: P1: In cases of illusory and of veridical willing, the subject has the same (kind of) experience of willing. P2: In cases of illusion the experience is not the cause of the action. C: In cases of veridical willing the experience is not the cause of the action....
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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