Unformatted text preview: But this model doesn’t seem to be apt for the second case, which is one where there is inner conflict between desires (either over which desire to act on first, or over which desire to act on at all); here the point seems to be that one makes a decision to embrace one desire rather than another. In the case where it isn’t just a question of which desire to act on first, the rejected desire now becomes an ‘outlaw’ (p. 170). Again, resonance doesn’t seem to be required. Note further that Frankfurt hasn’t given us an analysis of what such a decision amounts to. In particular, he hasn’t done it in terms of desires. So we have apparently left the Hobbesian model completely. The model looks more like Bratman’s. Frankfurt seems to think that decision is the method by which one eliminates inconsistency: by which one becomes wholehearted (NB. This is to interpret wholeheartedness as a property of the individual, not of a desire. In ordinary use the latter is more common, and Frankfurt sometimes individual, not of a desire....
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- Fall '09
- Psychology, Consistency, Metalogic, Gödel's incompleteness theorems, Equiconsistency