Unformatted text preview: doesn’t just conclude that such states would be desires. So he must think that desires have features that distinguish them from such states.) So we are left with the thought that desires have certain features (that makes the Humean theory non-trivial); and then we can ask whether every action is motivated by states that have those features. Smith assumes that they are, but that is far from obvious. One putative class of counter-examples that we have already mentioned is addictive and compulsive behavior. Perhaps Smith will say that this is not intentional behavior (that is controversial). Another class of putative counterexamples that we shall go on to consider at length is the class of intentions. Intentions have features that plausibly distinguish them from desires (for instance they are under our control in a way that desires are not, they have a different phenomenology); and yet they are plausibly motivating....
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- Fall '09
- Psychology, Thought, desires, humean theory