Free Will - Free Will FRANKFURT ON ALTERNATIVE...

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Unformatted text preview: Free Will FRANKFURT ON ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES Frankfurt's basic contention is simple: contrary to what we have suggested, it is not true that you are not responsible if you could not have done otherwise. That is, he wants to reject: The principle of alternate possibilities: A person is morally responsible for their act only if they could have done otherwise. The principle is a problem for the compatibilist, since, if determinism is true, no one could have done otherwise. Frankfurt aims to show the principle is false by counterexample: by showing that you can be responsible for doing something even though you could not have done otherwise. The basic move is to provide examples that draw apart the two properties. First example: Coercion. Perhaps PAP gets its appeal from the idea that a person who is coerced is not morally responsible. Suppose that Jones is threatened by Black that he will suffer dire consequences if (and only if?) he does not do something that he has already decided to do. Is he consequences if (and only if?...
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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Free Will - Free Will FRANKFURT ON ALTERNATIVE...

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