Kane wants an account that respects both The Explanation Condition and The Ultimacy Condition

Kane wants an account that respects both The Explanation Condition and The Ultimacy Condition

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Kane wants an account that respects both The Explanation Condition and The Ultimacy Condition. He thinks that free will arises in cases of deliberation. Suppose an agent is debating whether to do the moral or the selfish thing. They are pulled in both directions. The conflict is resolved by a ‘effort of will’, that results in a choice. Suppose that they decide to do the good thing. Then there are factors that cause the decision (the agent’s beliefs about what is right, their weighing of the circumstances, and so on); so this is not agent causation. But the decision is nonetheless indeterministic: it is not determined by those factors. (One way of thinking about this is to imagine two agents, with the same history, one of whom chooses one way, and one of whom chooses the other. What is to explain the difference?) Doesn’t this mean that there is no explanation as demanded by The Explanation Condition? Of course there is a plain explanation of why they did what they did. But we are after a contrastive
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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