KAVKA - desires change as time changes but that it changes...

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KAVKA’S TOXIN PUZZLE The bizarre billionaire offers you $1m iff you will form the intention to drink a very nasty (but non-fatal) toxin. You decide to do so. Then he says that you don’t actually have to drink it, only to sincerely intend on the night before. Two questions: (i) can you so intend? (ii) even if you can, is it rational to intend to do so? And another question: (iii) is it rational to drink the toxin? The example brings out the distinction between reasons for performing an action, and reasons for intending to form the action. (Perhaps we can get them going in the other way too: you get the $1m iff you drink the toxin without intending to.) TWO OTHER PUZZLE CASES The reciprocal suitcase deal (compare Broome’s wolf case). The self-torturer (note that this case, like that of Ann, seems to involve the idea not simply that
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Unformatted text preview: desires change as time changes, but that it changes in response to other behavior). BRATMAN’S TROUBLEMAKING PRINCIPLES The Linking Principle: I shouldn’t form an intention that I now believe I should, at the time of action, rationally revise. Or, more precisely: If, on the basis of deliberation, an agent rationally settles at t1 on an intention to A at t2 if (given that) C, and if she expects that under C at t2 she will have rational control of whether or not she A’s, then she will not suppose at t1 that if C at t2 she should, rationally, abandon her intention in favor of an intention to perform an alternative to A. (Bratman, 1998, 64) The standard view: My ranking now should depend on the ranking that I will make at the time....
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