Libertarianism - involves rejecting(i the version of(ii...

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Libertarianism KANE Kane is a libertarian. But unlike most libertarians (e.g. Taylor, Chisholm and Clarke), he rejects agent causation, i.e. the thesis that is defined by the following two claims: (i) unlike the event causation that obtains elsewhere in nature (one event causes another event), free acts are caused by agents, i.e. by things, and not by events. (ii) when an agent causes a free act to happen, the agent is not caused (or is not determined) to act by anything else In its stead he embraces the Teleological Intelligibility approach (i.e. the approach that makes the goal of the action intelligible; other writers call this, rather less grandiosely, ‘event-causal libertarianism’, to make clear the contrast with agent-causal libertarianism). Crucially, this
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Unformatted text preview: involves rejecting (i); the version of (ii) that he accepts involves the claim that the agent is caused but is not determined to act. Central to Kanes account is the idea that the agent causal account cannot resolve a tension between two ideas that it wants to respect: (I) The Explanation condition: the account gives us an explanation of why the agent did one thing rather than another. (This in turn is later broken into two parts: how the agent can produce the outcome, and how it can be done for a reason.) (II) The Ultimacy condition: the ultimate explanation of why the agent did one thing rather than another resides in the agent (that the agent did it) and nowhere else. (I have simplified Kanes presentation of these points)...
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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