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Unformatted text preview: Reflection on what was said about coercion above might suggest an alternative to PAP, which we can call PAP*: The principle of alternate possibilities*: A person is not morally responsible for their act if they did it because they could not have done otherwise. This principle seems to still be problematic for the compatibilist, since if a person is determined, then the reason that they act as they do is because of their causal antecedents. But Frankfurt rejects that principle too (what is his argument here?) and instead accepts The principle of alternate possibilities**: A person is not morally responsible for their act if they only did it because they could not have done otherwise. In particular, he thinks that when we excuse someone because he couldnt have done otherwise, we must be taking it that their desires didnt cause them to do it. There is a tricky issue here with individuating causal chains. Frankfurt is assuming that if the only reason that they do it is that then couldnt have done otherwise, then it follows that they didnt do it because they wanted to...
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- Fall '09