Unformatted text preview: RESPONSES One response is to deny P1: to say that perceptions and illusions have nothing in common. Yet this seems implausible here. Isn’t it obvious that they have something in common: they are realized by the same kind of neuro-physiological states. The proponent of the approach will thus have to deny that mental states supervene on neuro-physiological states. It is unlikely that Wegner would be convinced by such a move. So is there an alternative approach that we can take? There is. Wegner seems to be contending that willings are not an intrinsic part of the process by which somebody acts, but are, at best, extrinsic accompaniments to that process. As he puts it, “conscious will is not inherent in action” (p. 11 of this book). One way to go is to concede that the consciousness of the willing is not intrinsic to the process of action; but to deny that it follows that the willing itself is not intrinsic to the action. This approach concedes the conclusion of the argument: the experience of willing is not the cause of the action, but rejects...
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- Fall '09