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Unformatted text preview: questions about how things are; and practical questions are questions about what we ought to do; and there are good reasons for thinking that we can never derive an ought-statement from an is-statement; the contention sometimes known as Humes Law.) All of this has addressed the compatibility of determinism and our practice of ascribing moral responsibility. But what about the compatibilism of determinism with the claim that people are free? (What we might call freedom compatibilism, to distinguish it from responsibility compatibilism.) There are two ways to go here. One is to accept that the claim that people are free is a theoretical claim, but one which is detached from the practical question of how we should treat people. So even if freedom compatibilism is false, this wont have any terrible consequences for our practice of ascribing blame. (But what should we make of the phenomenology of freedom?)...
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This note was uploaded on 11/14/2011 for the course PSY PSY2012 taught by Professor Scheff during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.
- Fall '09