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Velleman on Intention

Velleman on Intention - goes even further not only does...

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Velleman on Intention Intention as Belief Bratman, as we saw, held that belief in one’s success is not a requirement on intention. He cited various examples (the fallen tree; the bookstore visit) in support of this. But one problem with his view is that it is not obvious that it can explain how intentions can serve to enable coordination if we do not in general believe that we intend what we do intend; nor is it clear that it can explain why there is a consistency requirement on our intentions. One response to these worries is to hold that intention does entail belief. Velleman’s account
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Unformatted text preview: goes even further: not only does intention entail belief, it actually is belief, though belief of a special kind: ‘self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment, and that represent themselves as such’. Why the motivation by desire? Consider the insomniac who believes he will not go to sleep, and whose belief is what keeps him awake, and who realizes that this is so. We wouldn’t say that he intends to stay awake. But if his belief is motivated by a desire to stay awake, that is much more plausible....
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