Notes on Readings - People and Their Bodies: Judith Jarvis...

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People and Their Bodies: Judith Jarvis Thomson (l) - simple view is that people are their bodies, but when one dies their bodies do not automatically go out of existence - Locke says: a person at a time (t) is a thinking intelligent being at t, therefore nothing is, at t, both dead and a person - Also: a thing is a thinking intelligent being at t if it is conscious at t, therefore nothing is, at t, both unconscious and a person . .. are we consciousnesses? (coma?) - Locke believes that x and y can be the same man, and each is a person, but x and y are not the same person - no man is a person, though a man may make a person at different times (ll) Physical Thesis : People are their bodies Physical Criterion : x=y, iff x’s body = y’s body - physical thesis is one about ontology, entailing a physical criterion - physical criterion physical thesis, however when one accepts one they usually accept the other (lll) Brown-Case-One: - transplant brain of Brown-body into Robinson-body, the survivor is exactly like brown - many people seem to think: (1) survivor = Brown (2) survivor’s body Brown body - If we think this, Brown has switched bodies and we give up both Physical Criterion and Physical thesis - why do people think (1)? Brown-Case-Two: - drugs used altered the brain so survivor thought he was Robinson - the only reason to think survivor=Brown is because the brain was formerly in Brown’s body - when you get a liver transplant, you get off the table as yourself, therefore survivor Brown - this differs from Case-One because the brain is not acting as “the carrier of a person’s psychology” Brown-Case-Three - reprogram Robinson’s brain with Brown’s psychology and destroy all of Brown-body - some say that the survivor is Brown, as the transplant of his psychology is sufFcient - others say that transplanting the brain and the psychology are both necessary, and that transplanting the brain must have cause psychology to be transplanted - this view does not lie in the fact that the brain is the carrier Criterions for Body-Switching
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Pure psychological criterion for body-switching: psychology is necessary and sufFcient for body switch Impure psychological criterion for body-switching: transferring psychology by way of brain is sufFcient and necessary for body switching - why must a transplanted body part play such a causal role? (whether it be brain, or liver) - those who believe in pure, and that Brown switches bodies in Case-One and Case-Two, reject Physical Criterion and believe that “psychological connectedness is the mark of personal identity” Psychological Criterion (Connectedness): x=y iff there are times t and t’ such that y is at t’ psychologically connected to x at t. ... this is why Brown is Brown in those two cases - differing with the survivor in Brown Case-
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Notes on Readings - People and Their Bodies: Judith Jarvis...

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