# 2004_midterm_1 - 14.12 Game Theory Fall 2004 Midterm 1 in...

This preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

14.12 Game Theory Fall 2004 Midterm 1 10/13/04 in class (You have 80 minutes. Good Luck!) 1. Consider the following game: A B C a 3,0 0,3 0,x b 0,3 3,0 0,x c x,0 x,0 x,x a. (15pts) Compute two Nash equilibria for x = 1. b. (10pts) For each equilibrium in part a, check if it remains a Nash equilibrium when x = 2. 2. Consider the following game: 1 2,2 2,2 2 X E a b c 1 L R L R 3,1 0,0 0,0 1,3 a. (10pts) Compute two subgame-perfect equilibria. b. (10pts) Represent this game in strategic form. c. (5pts) Find a Nash equilibrium that is not subgame-perfect. 3. Consider two players who own a dollar, which they need to share to consume. Each player cares about his and his opponent’s consumption level. We will first assume that the players are malevolent. The payoff of a player is u = x – α y, where x is his own consumption level, y is his opponent’s consumption level, and α is a number in (0,1). a.

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

## This note was uploaded on 11/28/2011 for the course ECONOMICS 114.126 taught by Professor Muhammadyildiz during the Spring '05 term at University of Massachusetts Boston.

### Page1 / 2

2004_midterm_1 - 14.12 Game Theory Fall 2004 Midterm 1 in...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online