ec109fa11_mt_sol

ec109fa11_mt_sol - L: 1 / 4 R: 3 / 4 Y5,B8: dp + j (1-p ) =...

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Ec109 Fall 2011 Midterm - Solutions Y1,B6: Number of information sets for Player 3: 3. Number of strategy profiles: 64 Y2,B5: Normal form matrix: Player 1 Player 2 X Y IA 3 , 3 1 , 2 IB 0 , 0 0 , 6 OA 2 , 5 2 , 5 OB 2 , 5 2 , 5 Y3,B2: Efficient strategy profiles: ( B,W ), ( C,Z ), ( D,Y ) Nash equilibria: ( A,W ), ( C,Z ), ( D,X ) Y4: D is dominated by strategies σ 1 = ( p, 1 - p, 0) where 0 < p < 1 / 3. Probability that player 1 plays U: 2/5 M: 3/5 D: 0 Probability that player 2 plays L: 3 / 4 R: 1 / 4 B7: U is dominated by strategies σ 1 = (0 , 1 - p,p ) where 0 < p < 1 / 3. Probability that player 1 plays U: 0 M: 3/5 D: 2/5 Probability that player 2 plays
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Unformatted text preview: L: 1 / 4 R: 3 / 4 Y5,B8: dp + j (1-p ) = fp + l (1-p ) = hp + n (1-p ) Y6,B3: u 1 ( q 1 ,q 2 ) = (60-q 1-q 2 ) q 1-12 q 1 , BR 1 ( q 2 ) = 24-q 2 / 2, Nash Eqm: q * 1 = 16, q * 2 = 16. Y7: BR 1 (40) = 60, R 2 i = { 45 , 46 ,..., 120 } , R i = { 120 } . B4: BR 1 (30) = 45, R 2 i = { 45 , 46 ,..., 120 } , R i = { 120 } . Y8: (a) B, (b) B, (c) True, (d) False B1: (a) False, (b) True, (c) B, (d) B 1...
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