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Final+Study+Guide+S11 - Final Exam Study Guide POL3 Spring...

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Final Exam Study Guide POL3, Spring 2011 The final exam will consist of multiple-choice, fill-in-blank and short-essay questions, and possibly a game-theory problem or two. In general, the final will be non-cumulative : that is, it will cover only material not covered on previous exams. The topics you need to know are indicated below. The one exception to the non-cumulativeness rule is that you should remember how to solve games of both perfect and imperfect information. I will probably ask you to relate some post-midterm topics (e.g. the democratic peace, exchange rates) to games that I construct, so you need to remember how to interpret extensive-form games. THE SELECTORATE THEORY 1. Who are the main actors in the selectorate theory? What do they want? How do they obtain what they want? 2. What are the differences between public and private goods? Who benefits from these goods? How does variation in the size of W affect the relative provision of these goods? THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE 4. What are the central empirical regularities of the democratic peace? How does the selectorate theory account for these empirical trends? Be sure you understand the arguments
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This note was uploaded on 12/02/2011 for the course POL 3 taught by Professor Maoz during the Spring '06 term at UC Davis.

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Final+Study+Guide+S11 - Final Exam Study Guide POL3 Spring...

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