Midterm+2+Study+Guide

Midterm+2+Study+Guide - MIDTERM 2 STUDY GUIDE POL3, SPRING...

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MIDTERM 2 STUDY GUIDE POL3, SPRING 2011 The second midterm will draw on material from Chapters 3 and 4 of the BDM textbook. As before, you do not need to memorize facts (names, dates, places, payoffs, etc.). You do, however, need to understand the theoretical concepts we have discussed. Here are some more specific guidelines: CHAPTER 3 1. You should understand the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specifically, you should understand the payoffs for cooperation and defection (T, R, P, S) and what it means to say that T > R > P > S. You should understand why each player has a dominant strategy to defect, what this implies about the equilibrium of a one-shot game, and why this outcome is Pareto suboptimal. If I alter the relative payoffs in the game matrix (e.g. so that the game looks like Chicken, Battle of the Sexes, or something else), you should be able to say how this alters the equilibria of the game. Finally, you should be able to relate the problems involved in these 2x2 games to the problems of coordination, distribution, monitoring and sanctioning that we discussed earlier in the class. 2.
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This note was uploaded on 12/02/2011 for the course POL 3 taught by Professor Maoz during the Spring '06 term at UC Davis.

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Midterm+2+Study+Guide - MIDTERM 2 STUDY GUIDE POL3, SPRING...

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