POL101 War Notes 1

POL101 War Notes 1 - c – cost of war for each player E.g...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–6. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
POL 101 World Politics Why Do Wars Occur? (brief notes)
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Question: Why do wars occur? Answer #1: The leaders are irrational. Answer #2: The leaders are malicious. Answer #3: The leaders are rational but things happen… Rationalist explanations: when do the things happen?
Background image of page 2
Starting points (1) War is costly and risky. (2) Rational actors would prefer a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Common explanations why wars might occur but no explanations why negotiations do not succeed despite (1) and (2). - it is easy to find a problem - it is not easy to explain why the problem leads to a conflict
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
A model of conflict and cooperation Cooperate/Divide Defect/Fight Cooperate/Divide V*p, V*(1-p) 0, V Defect/Fight V, 0 V*p – c, V*(1-p) – c V – value of the resource p – probability of winning by the row player (1-p) – probability of winning by the other player
Background image of page 4
Background image of page 5

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Background image of page 6
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: c – cost of war for each player E.g., V*p – c is the expected value of war for the row player NOTICE: The game has a structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as long as V*p > c Three General Mechanisms Wars happen (=negotiations failure) because of: Asymmetric Information: Private information about capabilities and incentives to misrepresent the latter. Commitment Problems: Inability to commit oneself to certain behavior. Absence of trust. Issue Indivisibility: Discrete bargaining range. How Can We Make War Less Likely? • Raising the costs of war (including intangible costs) • Increasing transparency • Providing outside enforcement of commitments • Dividing apparently indivisible goods...
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 12/06/2011 for the course POL 101 taught by Professor Sekercioglu during the Fall '08 term at SUNY Stony Brook.

Page1 / 6

POL101 War Notes 1 - c – cost of war for each player E.g...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 6. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online