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Unformatted text preview: Because so much has been said in the various sections of the Enquiry concerning the feelings of approval for that which is useful and agreeable to ourselves and to others as the essential basis for morality, he now gives special attention to the subject of reason and the function which it performs in connection with moral sentiments. To make his position entirely clear, he finds it necessary to indicate both what it is that reason is capable of doing and what it is incapable of doing. This will not only throw light on the nature of the rational element that is involved in moral thinking, but it will enable one to avoid those errors which attribute to reason a function which properly belongs to the feelings. In the first place, it requires no argument at all to establish the fact that reason is an indispensable tool for finding out what actions are the ones most likely to be of the greatest use in meetings the...
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- Fall '11