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Closely allied with this view and in some respects forming a part of it is the assertion that there

Closely allied with this view and in some respects forming a part of it is the assertion that there

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Closely allied with this view and in some respects forming a part of it is the assertion that there can  be no such thing as a  disinterested  action. Whenever one performs an act of kindness or generosity  toward another person, it is said that he does so for the sake of the satisfaction which he himself will  derive from it. This may involve a feeling of moral superiority on his part, the likelihood that he will be  praised for the performance of a good deed, or any one of numerous other benefits of a similar  nature. That a motivation of this kind is a real possibility Hume does not deny, but, at the same time,  he asserts with emphasis that this is not the only possibility open to an individual. That one may act for the sake of someone else rather than for himself is evidenced by the fact that 
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