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Unformatted text preview: This much Hume appears to have recognized, for in his discussion of the function of reason, he makes it very clear that reason can reveal only matters of fact, and it is quite impossible to derive what ought to be from what is. However, there is no other way on an empirical basis for one to distinguish between activities that are good and the ones that are bad. Those who do attempt to make distinctions of this kind are forced by the logic of the situation to identify what is good with that which is approved because one finds it both pleasant and agreeable. This would imply that the word "good" in the moral sense of the term means nothing other than that which is liked or approved. This interpretation of goodness, while consistent with the empirical method which Hume followed, leaves unanswered some very difficult questions. How, for example, can one refer to any activity as leaves unanswered some very difficult questions....
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This note was uploaded on 12/06/2011 for the course ENG 101 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '11 term at University of Houston.
- Fall '11