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14 - 1 Saying something is good for a being doesn’t mean...

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#14-Comments on Holmes Rolston’s “Naturalizing Values” by Ned Hettinger by Sara Maxfield I. Rolston’s Case 1. Natural value is nonanthropocentric 2. Nature’s usefulness to nonhuman sentient animals proves that it has value that doesn’t depend on humans 3. Possibility of intrinsic value in nature 4. Biological descriptions about what is good for organisms are factual statements about values in the natural world 5. Intrinsic value exists wherever there is “positive creativity” in nature II. Argument Against
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Unformatted text preview: 1. Saying something is good for a being doesn’t mean that the organism values it 2. “If instrumental goods are good only insofar as they are a means to some other good, and if we rule out an endless series or loop of instrumental values (as some pragmatists would allow), then objective instrumental goods for insentient organisms entail the existence of objective intrinsic goods” (pg 123) 3. Sebjectivists v. objectivists- did the world possess value before humans even existed?...
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