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Unformatted text preview: Arms Sales for India How Military Trade Could Energize U.S.-Indian Relations Much has been made of U.S. President Barack Obama's pledge to support India's push for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which was offered during his November trip to India, but the real story from his visit was its implications for bilateral military trade. During the trip, Obama announced that the United States would sell $5 billion worth of U.S. military equipment to India, including ten Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and 100 General Electric F-414 fighter aircraft. Although the details are still being worked out, these and other contracts already in the works will propel the United States into the ranks of India's top three military suppliers, alongside Russia and Israel. With India planning to buy $100 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years, arms sales may be the best way for the United States to revive stagnating U.S.- Indian relations. Even as nonmilitary trade and investment and social and cultural ties between India and the United States have advanced in recent years, Washington remains of two minds about its relationship with New Delhi. In 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush granted India an unprecedented nuclear deal, offering to assist India's civilian nuclear program in contravention of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The nuclear deal convinced many Indians that the United States could be a viable long-term partner. Bush's adamant resistance to Chinese and international nonproliferation advocates' pressure to abandon the deal cemented his status in India, as did his rebuffs of Pakistani demands for similar treatment. Convinced that the domestic political price of friendship with the United States was worth paying, the Indian government began in 2005 to make concessions to U.S. foreign policy priorities. It sharply cut back its official assessments of terrorist activity in Kashmir and of infiltration from Pakistan. With tensions immediately lower between India and Pakistan, the United States was able to push Pakistan to focus on the Taliban. In particular, the Pakistani army moved more troops from its eastern border with India to its western border with Afghanistan. And the same year, the Indian government even entered into secret talks with Pakistan to work out a permanent settlement on Kashmir. (The talks failed, however, when Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's government imploded in August 2008, and they never got back on track after the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai.) Since coming to power, the Obama administration has shifted course, partly on the grounds that Bush gave India too much, especially in regard to the nuclear deal. The Obama administration wants greater reciprocity--including Indian support for U.S....
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This note was uploaded on 12/07/2011 for the course ECON 101 taught by Professor Smith during the Fall '11 term at Allan Hancock College.
- Fall '11