coldboot-sec08 - LestWeRemember:ColdBootAttackson...

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Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on  Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on  Encryption Keys Encryption Keys J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger, William Clarkson, William Paul, Joseph A.  J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger, William Clarkson, William Paul, Joseph A.  Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman, Jacob Appelbaum, and Edward W. Felten Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman, Jacob Appelbaum, and Edward W. Felten In Proceedings of the 2008 USENIX Security Symposium. In Proceedings of the 2008 USENIX Security Symposium. Awarded Best Student Paper Awarded Best Student Paper Presented by: Payas Gupta Year II of SRG
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In today’s talk… In today’s talk… Introduction Characterizing Remanence Effects Imaging Residual Memory Key Reconstruction Identifying Keys in Memory Attacking Encrypted Disks Countermeasures and Limitations Conclusions
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Introduction Introduction Is it true? Computer’s memory is erased almost  immediately when it loses power. Ordinary DRAMs typically lose their contents  gradually over a period of seconds Data will persist for minutes or even hours if  the chips are kept at low temperatures
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Introduction Introduction Exploit DRAM remanence effects to recover  cryptographic keys held in memory Defeated popular encryption systems  including BitLocker, TrueCrypt etc. Many other security systems are probably  vulnerable. Mac OS X leaves the user’s login password in  memory, and can be recovered using Cold boot  attack.
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Introduction Introduction However, newer memory technologies, which  use higher circuit densities, tended to decay  more quickly than older ones Could able to reconstruct keys AES, DES, triple DES, RSA, tweak keys
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Characterizing Remanence Effects Characterizing Remanence Effects DRAM cell is essentially a capacitor Over time charge will leak and cell will lose  its state To forestall this, cell must be refreshed Standard refresh time is order of  ms
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coldboot-sec08 - LestWeRemember:ColdBootAttackson...

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