changbin - Incentives and Pricing in Communication...

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Incentives and Pricing in Communication Networks Zhiyi Huang, Changbin Liu, Qi Zhang Dec 1, 2009
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Problem statement Network resource allocation Competing users in communications networks Quality of Service (QoS) requirements Multiple self-interested agents may require tools from me theory game theory Difficulty to formulate and implement centralized control protocols Scalable as the growth of networks and newly interactions between administrative domains and end users Without centralized control, the interaction of multiple selfish agents may lead to suboptimal resource allocation
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Roadmap Two strategic settings of pricing : Achieve socially optimal objective for the network Multiple competing service providers set prices to maximize their revenues using game-theoretic techniques Additional: emerging applications of game theory to communication networks, and future directions
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Network model Network is shared by many users , and network resources are link bandwidths , i.e. maximum data transmitting rate Each end user is interested in transferring data etween a source and a destination along a fixed route between a source and a destination along a fixed route Links has finite capabilities
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changbin - Incentives and Pricing in Communication...

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