How Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups End

How Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups End - How Guerrilla and...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
How Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups End A counterterrorist policy should be tailor-made for a particular group, taking into account its historical, cultural, political, and social context, as well as the context of what is known about the psychology of the group or its leaders. The motivations of a terrorist group—both of its members and of its leaders—cannot be adequately understood outside its cultural, economic, political, and social context. Because terrorism is politically or religiously motivated, a counterterrorist policy, to be effective, should be designed to take into account political or religious factors. For example, terrorists were active in Chile during the military regime (1973-90), but counterterrorist operations by democratic governments in the 1990s have reduced them to insignificance. The transition from military rule to democratic government in Chile proved to be the most effective counterterrorist strategy. In contrast to relatively insignificant political terrorist groups in a number of 68 countries, Islamic terrorist groups, aided by significant worldwide support among Muslim fundamentalists, remain the most serious terrorist threat to U.S. security interests. A U.S. counterterrorist policy, therefore, should avoid making leaders like Osama bin Laden heroes or martyrs for Muslims. To that end, the eye-for-aneye Israeli policy of striking back for each act of terrorism may be highly counterproductive when applied by the world’s only superpower against Islamic terrorism, as in the form of cruise-missile attacks against, or bombings of, suspected terrorist sites. Such actions, although politically popular at home, are seen by millions of Muslims as attacks against the Islamic religion and by people in many countries as superpower bullying and a violation of a country’s sovereignty. U.S. counterterrorist military attacks against elusive terrorists may serve only to radicalize large sectors of the Muslim population and damage the U.S. image worldwide. Rather than retaliate against terrorists with bombs or cruise missiles, legal, political, diplomatic, financial, and psychological warfare measures may be more effective. Applying pressure to state sponsors may be especially effective. Cuba
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
and Libya are two examples of terrorist state sponsors that apparently concluded that sponsoring terrorists was not in their national interests. Iran and Syria may still need to be convinced. Jeanne Knutson was critical of the reactive and ad hoc nature of U.S.
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 12/04/2011 for the course ANTHRO 2000 taught by Professor Monicaoyola during the Fall '10 term at Broward College.

Page1 / 5

How Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups End - How Guerrilla and...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online