U. S. Supreme Court Cases
Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock
, 485 U.S. 624 (1988)
International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell
, 512 U.S. 821, 829, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642, __ 114 S. Ct.
2552, __ (1994)
Shillitani v. United States
, 384 U.S. 364 (1966)
United States v. Bajakajian
, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2046 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
U. S. Courts of Appeals Cases
Banks v. United States
, 614 F.2d 95, 100 n.13 (6th Cir., 1980).
United States v. Campbell
, 73 F.3d 362, ____ (6th Cir.,1995) 25
Is incarceration for
contempt an appropriate remedy to enforce child support orders against impoverished
debtors, who cannot afford to pay child support immediately and who have no immediate offers of employment that
they are willfully refusing to accept?
Do the United States and Tennessee Constitutions prohibit Tennessee from creating debtor prisons, in which
indigent citizens who owe a
debt are incarcerated for
contempt, yet they have little or no income with
which to comply with the court's child support orders and little or no funds to pay any amount required to purge
their contempt and secure their own release from jail?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by selecting a $100 purge amount in its Nov. 30, 2000, order of incarceration
for civil contempt against the appellant, when the record contains no evidence that the appellant had immediate
control over $100 at the instant of her incarceration, and thus the
appellant could not take any action to secure her
own release from jail?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by following procedures for a
contempt hearing on Feb. 4, 1999, and
Aug. 30, 2000, when both the state and the trial court were motivated to
the alleged contemnor for past
behavior and not to coerce her into taking some action then within her control?
Despite the fact that the trial court upon rehearing lowered the original civil contempt purge amount from $1,000 to
nunc pro tunc
, was Gwen Knox wrongfully incarcerated for eights days in February 1999, in violation of her
constitutional rights, and thus entitled to compensatory damages?
Did the trial court’s decisions on Feb. 4, 1999, and Nov. 30, 2000, concerning the appellant's mother providing child
care services without compensation violate the federal and Tennessee constitutional prohibitions against slavery, and
further constitute an abuse of discretion in that the trial court had neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction
over the appellant's mother?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when (1) it ordered on Feb. 4, 1999, and reiterated by order of Nov. 30, 2000,
that the appellant should pay approximately $225/month in child support when the preponderance of evidence
showed her monthly income was $0/month, (2) the trial court refused to modify the appellant’s child support