{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

# PS17 - Intermediate Microeconomics Winter 2008 Problem Set...

This preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

Intermediate Microeconomics, Winter 2008 Problem Set No 17 due: Wednesday, March 26; Thursday, March 27 Reading: To prepare for the next lecture, please read: Chapter 13, 483-486 (Monopolistic Competition), Chaper 14, 513 -514 (Repeated Games) Solve the following problems from the book, Chapter 13: 16 ° , 34 W , Q1. Reconsider question 3 from Problem Set 16 (Guard for a Mall). Suppose the two stores choose the number of guards sequentially, i.e., °rst store A chooses whether to hire zero, one, two, or three guards and then store B chooses whether to hire zero, one, two, or three guards. a) Find all subgame perfect equilibria. For each subgame perfect equilibrium, write down the complete equilibrium strategy of store B, i.e., write down how many guards B would hire, after A has hired X guards. b) Find some additional Nash equilibria in which A hires a di/erent number of guards. Do not forget to write down the complete strategy of store B . Q2. Suppose American and United compete on the ORD-DTW route in a Stackelberg fashion. As you know, demand on that route is given by

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

### Page1 / 2

PS17 - Intermediate Microeconomics Winter 2008 Problem Set...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online