Topics for the Final Exam (New Material)
Note:
The topics listed below are indicative but not exhaustive. In general, we
have followed the book only very loosely. Therefore, only material
covered either in the lecture or on the problem sets is relevant material
for the exam. (You might still find it helpful to read the related chapters
in the book (11 14, 18, 19). In particular, Chapter 13 and 14 are close
to what we covered while chapters 18 and 19 are not.)
Static Games:
Dominated Actions, Dominant Actions, Iterated Elimination of Strictly
Dominated Strategies (IESDS), Interpretation of IESDS, Application to
Price Setting and Quantity Setting with Two/Three Actions, Nash
Equilibrium, Best Response, Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium,
Application to Cournot, Bertrand with Differentiated Products, Cournot
with N Players, Lerner Formula, Positioning Game (Politics), Public
Good Provision
Dynamic Games:
Sequential actions, (Non)Credible Threats: Subgame Perfection and
Backward Induction, Commitment and First Mover Advantage,
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 Winter '08
 Burbidge,John
 Game Theory, Nash, Lerner Formula, Good Provision

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