ma111 ppr 1 - MA 111 Proj. p. 40 #75 Violating and...

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MA 111 Proj. p. 40 #75 Violating and Satisfying Criterion Preference ballots and schedules determine how we elect our winners. Once the ballots are in, its decision time. Who will be our winner and loser of the election? Why? The majority criterion states if a candidate has a majority of the first place votes, then that candidate should be the winner of the election. The majority candidate has half or more of the votes. There are widely used voting methods which can produce violations of the majority criterion. One would think likewise, if the majority voted a candidate last, then that candidate is not the winner . Using two examples, we can violate this statement. With the plurality method, any more than three candidates leaves no guarantee that there will be a majority candidate. There are 32 voters in table 1.1 with 16 votes needed to win. Candidate D has the majority of first place votes (15) and last place votes (17). table 1.1
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ma111 ppr 1 - MA 111 Proj. p. 40 #75 Violating and...

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