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Unformatted text preview: compare with L? Extension • What if tastes differ so that half of the population prefers role 1 and half prefers role 2? • Construct payoff matrix. • When is there a dominant strategy? Altruists Prisoners’ Dilemma: Ex 27.1 • Original game • What happens with altruists? – Try a=1 2 , 2 0 , 3 3 , 1 , 1 Quiet Fink Quiet Fink Road Warriors X B Y 6.9,12,15 A 6,9,12,15 20,21,22,23 20,21,22,23 Nash equilibrium • Make table Road Warriors II A New Road X B Y 6.9,12,15 A 6,9,12,15 20,21,22,23 20,21,22,23 7,8,9,10 Domination 0,0 1,0 1,1 1,1 1,1 3,0 1,1 2,1 2,2 Left Center Right Top Middle Bottom...
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 Fall '08
 Charness,G
 Game Theory, Dominant strategy, payoff matrix, 15,000 miles, Demand preferred role

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