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Unformatted text preview: Homework Problems, UCSB Econ 171, March, 2011 1) Three boys, Alan, Bill, and Charlie and three girls, Alice, Betsy, and Clara are planning dates for the senior prom. Their preferences over possible partners are given in this table: Person First Choice Second Choice Third Choice Alan Alice Betsy Clara Bill Betsy Alice Clara Charlie Alice Clara Betsy Alice Bill Alan Charlie Betsy Alan Bill Charlie Clara Alan Charlie Bill Suppose that partners are assigned by the deferred acceptance (Gale-Shapley) method, with the boys asking the girls for dates. On the first round, who asks Alice on the first round? Who asks Betsy? Who asks Clara? Who does Alice refuse on the first round? What happens on the second round? What is the final assignment of partners? Suppose that instead partners are assigned by the deferred acceptance method with the girls asking the boys for dates. What is the final assignment of part- ners? Which of the two outcomes is better for the boys? Which is better for the girls? Suppose that the boys get to do the asking, but Alice knows everybodys preferences and believes that everybody else will play according to the rules....
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This note was uploaded on 12/25/2011 for the course ECON 171 taught by Professor Charness,g during the Fall '08 term at UCSB.
- Fall '08