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Unformatted text preview: Econ 171 Spring 2010 Final Exam June 8 You have three hours to take this exam. Please answer all 5 questions, for a maximum of 100 points. Point totals and subtotals are indicated in brackets. To obtain credit, you must provide arguments or work to support your answer. 1. [10] Find all Nash equilibria of the following game. X Y Z A 2 , 1 4 , 2 2 , B 3 , 3 , 1 , 1 C 1 , 2 2 , 8 5 , 1 1 2. [20] Consider the extensiveform game represented below. C A 5 , 2 B 1 Y 6 , 2 X 2 , 6 Y 2 , 6 X 6 , 2 2 (a) [5] Which solution concept is the appropriate one to apply to this game? Find the set of equilibria using that concept. (b) [5] Suppose that we delete the information set between player 2’s two decision nodes. (Plugging the values ( a,b,c ) = (5 , 6 , 2) into the figure below shows the extensive form of this game.) In other words, suppose that 2 can actually observe whether 1 chose B or C . What solution concept should we apply now? Find the unique equilibrium under that concept....
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 Fall '08
 Charness,G
 Game Theory, player, Ilse

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