midterm_2006

midterm_2006 - Professor Rod Garratt November 8, 2006 Econ...

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Professor Rod Garratt November 8, 2006 Econ 210B Midterm Exam – Fall 2006 You can earn up to 40 points on this exam. You have 1 hour and 10 minutes to complete this exam. Explain everything that needs explaining. Good Luck! 1. Consider the following normal-form game. Player 2 L C R Player 1 T 2, 2 1, 3 0, 1 M 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 B 1, 0 0, 0 0, 0 a. Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (3 points) b. Is there a mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium? If there is, state one. (5 points) 2. Consider the game in question 1. State one (non-degenerate) correlated equilibrium for this game. Verify the equilibrium conditions. (6 points) 3. Two individuals are involved in a synergistic relationship. If both individuals devote more effort to the relationship they are both better off. For any given effort level of individual j , the return to individual i ’s effort first increases then decreases. Specifically, an effort level is a non-negative number, and individual i ’s preferences (for i = 1,2) are represented by the payoff function
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This note was uploaded on 12/26/2011 for the course ECON 210B taught by Professor Garratt during the Fall '09 term at UCSB.

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midterm_2006 - Professor Rod Garratt November 8, 2006 Econ...

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