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Professor Rod Garratt
Fall 2011
ECON 210B
Problem Set #3
Due Monday, February 7
1. Consider the following game
X
Y
X
4, 4
0, 0
Y
0, 0
1, 1
(a) Find all the symmetric Nash equilibria.
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Unformatted text preview: (b) Identify which if any of the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies are evolutionarily stable? Explain why or why not. Exercise 63.1, 64.1 1...
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This note was uploaded on 12/26/2011 for the course ECON 210B taught by Professor Garratt during the Fall '09 term at UCSB.
 Fall '09
 GARRATT

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