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# Ps4 - Professor Rod Garratt Winter 2011 ECON 210B Problem...

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Professor Rod Garratt Winter 2011 ECON 210B Problem Set #3 Due: Friday, March 4 (before section) 1. The following game is called Selton’s horse. 1 C 2 D 3 d 1,1,1 L R L R 3,3,2 0,0,0 4,4,0 0,0,1 Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Check whether each pure strategy Nash equilibrium is also a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 2. Consider the following game: (i) Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2, each game being equally likely. (ii) Player 1 (the row player) learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but player 2 does not. (iii) Player 1 chooses either T or B, Player 2 observes Player 1’s choice and then chooses either L or R. L R L R T 10, 0 10, 4 T 2, 12 30, 4 B 6, 9 20, 2 B 2, 12 2, 6 Game 1 Game 2 Find all the pure-strategy pooling and separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the resulting game. Be sure to specify the equilibrium strategies and beliefs in each case. 3. Once upon a time a signaling game was played between a princesses and a frog. The frog was the “Sender.” He could either say he was a ‘prince’ or a ‘frog.’ The princess was

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Ps4 - Professor Rod Garratt Winter 2011 ECON 210B Problem...

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