F_DynamicLD - Dynamic Labor Demand: A Simple Implicit...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Dynamic Labor Demand: A Simple Implicit Contract Model Imagine a group of N identical workers, all of whom are “permanently” attached to a firm. The workers are risk averse; the firm is risk neutral. The future value of the workers’ labor to the firm, θ , is unknown today, but the workers and firm would like to come up with a Pareto-efficient arrangement today that stipulates, for every possible θ , how many workers will be hired and the incomes of every one of them “tomorrow” (when θ is realized). The reason firms and workers might want to do this in advance is to take advantage of some gains from trade (involving the provision of insurance by the risk-neutral firm to the risk averse workers) that could not be realized in an ex-post spot market for labor services. Once this arrangement (or “implicit contract”) is in place, the covariation of employment and wages we observe will simply consist of the “playing out” of the rules of the contract in response to the realizations of θ . As we demonstrate below, this covariation can be very different from that generated by “spot” labor markets which operate after θ is realized ( and can make both workers and firms better off). 1. The base-case model (“ B” unconstrained) In our initial treatment, we will imagine that there is the possibility of private UI (payments by the firm to its unemployed workers), optimally chosen to be part of an efficient contract. We will change this assumption later. Throughout our treatment here, we will assume that employment adjusts only on the “extensive” margin (i.e. the number of people employed), so there is no variation in hours per worker. As a result, we can say that each worker supplies one unit of labor to the firm if employed and zero units otherwise. This assumption is relaxed in the Burdett-Wright and van Audenrode papers on the reading list, which consider the effects of short-time working and short-time-compensation. 1 We will also assume that, if some workers are not employed in a given state of nature ( θ ), these workers are chosen at random from the group. Since all workers (by assumption) are permanently attached to the firm, we interpret these episodes of nonwork as temporary layoffs. The phenomenon of layoffs by inverse seniority, plus a more continuous distinction between insiders and outsiders, is explored in my own paper on the reading list. Finally, we will assume that the realized value of the state, θ , is sufficiently observable to firms, workers and outside authorities that binding, contingent contracts can be based on it. The cases of asymmetric information regarding θ , and of “nonverifiable” θ ’s, are considered, among others, by O. Hart, “Optimal Labor Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction”, ReStud January 1983. In more detail, let the value of the firm’s output in state
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 12/26/2011 for the course ECON 250A taught by Professor Kuhn during the Fall '09 term at UCSB.

Page1 / 5

F_DynamicLD - Dynamic Labor Demand: A Simple Implicit...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online